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Titulaire d’un master en études européennes, Antoine Feron est doctorant et cher-
cheur à la Chaire Inbev-Baillet-Latour à l’Université Catholique de Louvain. 
Ses recherches portent sur la politique étrangère de l’Union euro-
péenne depuis le traité de Lisbonne et particulièrement sur la fonction de 
Haut Représentant de l’Union pour les Affaires étrangères et la Politique de sécurité.
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  IntroductIon
  Declaratory diplomacy is a staple of modern diplomacy. Issuing statements and dec-
larations is meant to convey positions, show presence and engagement as well as to apply political 
pressure1. On the contrary of the traditional quiet diplomacy, declaratory diplomacy looks for and re-
sponds to its audience. In the European Union, the High Representative is in charge of the declaratory 
diplomacy.
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Catherine Ashton has become the first High Represen-
tative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Being one of the voice and face of the EU 
and raising expectations as a perceived European Minister for Foreign Affairs, this job put her in the 
driving seat of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, difficulties remained. 
On the one hand, the nomination of Catherine Ashton generated loads of criticisms2. On the other hand, 
CFSP is still an intergovernmental policy where unanimity is the rule, despite the new legal powers. 
Indeed, as Petiteville pointed out in the early days of the Lisbon Treaty, without falling into the wrong 
trial that was brought upon her appointment for her lack of charisma and international diplomatic 
stature, one might wonder what Catherine Ashton may say on behalf of the EU when the latter has no 
particularly salient position to assert in a major crisis?3 On the basis of Petiteville’s questioning, the 
1  F. Wesslau, The Political Adviser’s Handbook, 79, Folke Bernadotte Academy (2013).
2  J. Howorth, The ‘News Faces’ of Lisbon : Assessing the Performance of Catherine Ashton and Herman van 
Rompuy on the Global Stage, (2011) 16 EFA Rev.
3  F. Petiteville, Les mirages de la politique étrangère européenne après Lisbonne, 51 Critique Internationale, 
104 (2011).
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aim of this research is to analyse what C. Ashton said during her tenure.
Indeed, during her five years term, the High Representative issued more than 1500 statements and dec-
larations. This abundance contrasts with the pre-Lisbon period4 and with the assumption that the High 
Representative has nothing to say. Therefore, our research question is the following one: What is the 
declaratory diplomacy of the High Representative?
Behind this general question, this paper is structured along four interrogations and sections. Primo, 
what is the nature of the High Representative’s declaratory diplomacy? This section identified the 
different tools of the declaratory diplomacy, their different authors and processes. Secundo, what is 
the geography of the declaratory diplomacy? This section identifies the distribution of the declaratory 
diplomacy among the world’s regions. Tertio, what are the motives driving the declaratory diplomacy? 
This third section investigates the eight motives for issuing a statement or a declaration. Quatro, what 
is the objective of the declaratory diplomacy? This section established a triple objective for the declar-
atory diplomacy. 
The studied declaratory diplomacy is composed of the statements and declarations of the High Repre-
sentative. Before the Lisbon Treaty, those CFSP statements and declarations were issued by the former 
High Representative / Council Secretary General and by the rotating presidency. While statements 
and declarations were not sufficiently dealt with contemporary scientific work, Vončina established 
an analysis of the pre-Lisbon declaratory diplomacy of the rotating presidency. She examined CFSP 
statements and declarations as an instrument of the CFSP and as a mirror of the CFSP. Her analysis 
suggests three findings. Firstly, the declaratory diplomacy is a single instrument of EU foreign policy. 
Secondly, statements and declarations are primarily aimed at expressing the EU’s reaction to a particu-
lar event or situation in the international community in the framework of the CFSP. Thirdly, they reflect 
the acquis politique, as suggested by Regelsberger and Wessels5, but also the decision-making process 
4  N. Helwig, P. Ivan & H. Kostanyan, The New EU Foreign Policy Architecture : Reviewing the first two years of 
the EEAS, CEPS Paperbacks 22 (2013).
5  E. Regelsberger & W. Wessels, The Evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. A case of an 
Imperfect Ratchet Fusion, in The European Union in the wake of the Eastern enlargement : Institutional and 
policy-making challenges (A. Verdun & O. Croci eds., Manchester University Press, 2005).
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in the framework of the CFSP and the ability to form a single voice6. On the basis of her works and 
framework of analysis, we investigate the post-Lisbon declaratory diplomacy. The purpose of this arti-
cle is therefore twofold: firstly, to update Vončina’s analysis to the post-Lisbon declaratory diplomacy, 
and secondly, to offer a quantitative cartography of C. Ashton’s declaratory diplomacy. 
This analysis takes into account all statements and declarations issued during C. Ashton’s tenure. They 
are located on the EEAS website7. However, the numbers presented in the article may differ to the 
numbers on the website. Indeed, due to some fuzziness on the EEAS website, the statements were all 
re-organized in order to avoid duplication. Also speeches, press releases and nominations have been 
excluded. From January 2010 to October 2014, 1753 CFSP statements and declarations have been 
issued. All statements and declarations are sorted according to their nature, geography (region and 
country), motives and date. Those labels were identified according to the title of the statements and if 
necessary the text of the statements. In case of multiple possible labels, the most salient was picked. 
Besides the author analysis of the whole statements and declarations, two interviews were realised with 
EEAS and Commission Officials.
  The NaTure of The DeclaraTory Diplomacy
  This section identifies firstly the different tools of the declaratory diplomacy and their 
authors, and secondly the process of those instruments.
 The Types of The DeclaraTory Diplomacy
 In order to make use of her declaratory diplomacy, the High Representative possesses three 
tools at her disposal: the declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the European Union, the 
statement of the High Representative and the statement of the High Representative’s spokesperson8. 
6  T. Vončina, Speaking with One Voice: Statements and Declarations as an Instrument of the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, (2011) 16 EFAR Rev.
7  http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/index_en.htm
8  There is also a fourth type of statement: the local statement. The local statement refers to local events and 
follows the same process as the other statements. It worth mentioning that it is a separate instrument from the 
head of EU delegation’s statement. As the heading does not mention the High Representative, they are not dealt 
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The differences between these three types of declaratory tools are the following.
The declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the European Union (declaration) is the suc-
cessor of the former declarations by the presidency on behalf of the EU when the rotating presidency 
was representing the EU for CSFP before the Lisbon Treaty. As its predecessor, the declaration needs 
an agreement of all member states. Consequently, the declaration refers not only to the High Represen-
tative but to the EU as a whole. Besides, the declaration can also contain an alignment clause which 
allows certain states to align themselves with the agreed text among the member states. The aligned 
states are mostly European countries such as the candidate countries, the potential candidate countries 
or close Europeans partners of the EU. Given the aforementioned coordination process, those declara-
tions are less frequent than the two others one.
On the contrary, the statements of the High Representative allow her to react quickly to a situation. 
Indeed, those statements require no coordination with the member states and only refer to the High 
Representative. However, as Helwig et alii pointed out, it is worth questioning if the subtle difference 
is acknowledged by external actors9. This statement is also both the successor of the statement of the 
presidency before Lisbon and of the former High Representative for CFSP.
The statements of the High Representative’s spokesperson match the High Representative’s statements, 
except that they are issued by a spokesperson. Indeed, according to an EEAS official, the EEAS tries 
to ensure that more statements of the spokespersons are issued in order to gain more impact for the 
High Representative’s statements. Some subjects are even the preserve of the High Representative as 
the death penalty.
In the case of the statements, a distinction can be made between the CFSP statements and the statements 
relating to international fora. Although the EEAS does not distinguish those two, the latter corresponds 
to a press release after a meeting in the EU, in an international organization or in a third country but 
also after a phone call with foreign officials. Despite the diplomatic content and impact of the latters, 
in this analysis.
9  N. Helwig, P. Ivan & H. Kostanyan, supra n.4, at 21.
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these statements are considered as press release. Consequently they are not dealt within this analysis.
In addition to her own statements, the High Representative also issued joint statements with other in-
ternational actors such as the European Commission, the president of the European Council, member 
states of the EU, third countries or international organizations. The European Commission is the main 
partner of those joint statements. Indeed, more than a 100 statements were issued with another member 
of the Commission. Štefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and the Neighbourhood Policy, is the 
most frequently joint partner. Together with the High Representative, they issued statements concern-
ing the Western Balkans (Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and FYROM), the Eastern neighbourhood 
(Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia) and the Southern neighbourhood (Moroc-
co, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt). However, despite the coherence of bridging the High Represen-
tative and the Commissioner in charge of the Neighbourhood Policy, such joint statements were not 
systematic when dealing with the mentioned countries. The Commissioner for Development, Andris 
Piebals, was the second frequent partner for joint statements. They issued some joint statements relat-
ing to African countries.
On a smaller scale, the High Representative issued joint statements, sometimes only once, with her 
other colleagues from the Commission. While some were in charge of an external portfolio, others 
dealt with internal competences with external implications. Those joint statements were either duo 
statements or group statements involving several commissioners and the High Representative. During 
her tenure, C. Ashton issued statements with the Commissioner for Trade; the Commissioner for In-
ternational Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response; the Commissioner for Home Affairs; 
with the Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship; but also with the Commis-
sioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries; the Commissioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship and 
the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro. The president of the Commission 
made only once a joint statement with the High Representative.
These joint statements with the European Commission put into practice the group of Commissioners 
for External Relations. Indeed, as the High Representative is in charge of the coherence of the Europe-
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an external action, a group of commissioners dealing with external portfolios was set up. However, this 
group was not very effective. It met only five times and C. Ashton did not chair any of those meeting. 
Instead this role was taken over by the president of the Commission. Although the joint statements 
provide grist for the mill of the group of commissioners, there are not the result of the group strategy 
and somehow existed already before the Lisbon treaty. Besides, the non-systematic procedure when 
dealing with Neighbourhood or African countries and the scarcity of other joint initiatives reduce the 
effectiveness and the coherence of such moves. Moreover the scarcity of joint statements is indicative 
of the turfs wars between commissioners and between the EEAS and the Commission’s DGs, espe-
cially with DG Echo for which the principles of humanitarian action override the political diplomacy 
of the EEAS.
Besides the Commission, the High Representative issued two statements with the post-Lisbon trium-
virate of the EU reuniting herself and the presidents of the Commission and of the European Council. 
She also issued one statement with the president of the European Council, one with France and the 
United Kingdom. Surprisingly, these joint statements did not always deal with major events of C. 
Ashton’s tenure. But the scarcity of those statements reflects the early days of the Lisbon Treaty. As a 
Commission official pointed out, the process was not yet settled down. Then a routine emerged. The 
High Representative stops issuing statements with the presidents because according to the protocol the 
presidents are in charge of the Heads of State and Government level while the High Representative 
deals with the minister level.
Moreover, the High Representative co-signed statements with two foreign counterparts, namely the 
US Secretary of State and the Russian Foreign Minister. Finally, the High Representative issued joint 
statements with international organizations such as the UN, the Council of Europe, the African Union, 
the Arab League of States and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
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Figure1: the High Representative’s Declaratory Diplomacy during C. Ashton’s term10.
Four remarks emerge from the figure above. First, the declarations are quite rare and are always less 
frequent than the statements, which inverses the pre-Lisbon trend11. Second, statements are frequent-
ly used by the High Representative. During the first two years, the High Representative’s statements 
were more abundant than the spokesperson’s ones. Then, from 2012 they follow grosso modo the same 
trend. Third, the declaratory diplomacy was not very used during the first year of C. Ashton’s tenure. 
The year 2011 experiences a mushrooming of statements which is due to the setting up of the EEAS 
and the crises of the “Arab spring”. Then, the trend is more stable until 2014. Fourth and final, the last 
months of C. Ashton’s term showed a change of trend. The High Representative’s statements dropped 
sharply while the spokesperson’s statements skyrocketed. Indeed, from the spring 2014 C. Ashton 
chose to progressively stop issuing statements in order to provide a transition period for her successor. 
Hence, her spokespersons took over. During this period and especially after the appointment of Federi-
10  January 2010 to September 2014. The last trimester being only made of October 2014 is not in the figure. 
The numbers are 4 HRUE, 2 HR and 26 SP.
11  N. Helwig, P. Ivan & H. Kostanyan, supra n.4, at 21; T. Vončina, supra n.6, at 173.
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ca Mogherini in late Augustus 2014, C. Ashton can be considered as a lame duck High Representative.
 
 The Process of The DeclaraTory DiPlomacy
 The process for issuing statements and declarations follows a bottom-up logic. It starts from an 
EEAS geographic bureau to the High Representative Office. First, a geographic bureau of the EEAS 
decides to issue a statement in order to react to an event in its related geographic area. On the basis of 
its information’s, in most cases from the IntCen – the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre, located in the 
EEAS– or the EU delegations, the bureau proposes a project of statement to the Managing director 
of its geographic area and if necessary also to other Managing directors of transversal or geographic 
services. Second, the project is transmitted to a team specialized in statement inside the political co-
ordination division. The function of this team is to facilitate the process and to ensure of the quality 
– coherence and unique language – of the declaratory diplomacy.
Third, the project is transmitted for adoption to the Corporate Board of the EEAS. The project is ad-
opted by at least one of its member. Somehow a geographic/thematic distribution exists among the 
members of the Board. However, this distribution is not always clear. Fourth, the project is transferred 
to the High Representative Cabinet. There, the cabinet member in charge of the related geographic 
area endorses the statement. The final step depends on the type of statement. Being a statement of the 
spokesperson, the statement does not need the approval of the High Representative and is then issued 
directly. Being a High Representative’s statement, the statement is send to her for approval. Finally, as 
a declaration, the project is send to the High Representative and to the 28 member states for approval 
via the COREU network12. In such cases, the EU delegations or the EU special representatives are 
sometimes involved in the process. The whole process takes at least one day. However, as some events 
can be planned such as elections or death penalty executions, the EEAS prepares drafts already en-
dorsed by the hierarchy. The day of the event, the appropriate draft is updated and immediately issued. 
At the end of the process, the statement or declaration is published on the EEAS website. It is also 
12  On the COREU see: F. Bichi & C. Carta, The COREU Network and the Circulation of Information Within EU 
Foreign Policy, Journal of European Integration, 34 (2012).
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issued on social networks such as Facebook or Twitter, sent to the mail list of the High Representative’s 
spokespersons and in some case announced during a press conference.
The choice between the three types of statements is made along the process and can change in case of 
an evolving situation. The three tools of the declaratory diplomacy have different diplomatic weights 
and are thus used accordingly. Two patterns emerge. On the one hand, a strong High Representative’s 
statement is issued, and then the follow-up is carried out by spokesperson’s statements. On the other 
hand, the strategy is progressive from a spokesperson’s statements to a High Representative one or a 
declaration. The initiative of issuing statements is a result of the EEAS, the office of the High Repre-
sentative, the EU Delegations or the EU special representatives. It worth noticing than about 30% of 
the declaration is following an initiative of the member states.
After taking office in November 2014, the new High Representative Federica Mogherini modified 
the process in order to be quicker. The slowness was due to need of the endorsement of the hierarchy. 
Besides, the question of who needed to endorse the statement was a headache for the unit in charge of 
the declaratory diplomacy. Indeed, according to the subject or geographic area, the unit had to choose 
the endorsers in the Corporate Board and between the EEAS managing directors. The new High Rep-
resentative introduced a by-passing process. The responsibility of choosing the endorsers is now under 
the responsibility of the Managing director.
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Figure 2: The process of the High representative declaratory diplomacy during C. Ashton’s tenure
  The geograPhy of The DeclaraTory DiPlomacy
  As the foreign policy of the EU, the declaratory diplomacy refers to various areas of 
work. In light of this heterogeneity, the table below classifies the statements and declarations according 
to the region to which they refer. Indeed, all statements and declarations are divided according to eight 
regions of the world: Latin America, North America, North Africa, Africa, the Middle East and the 
Gulf, the Middle East Peace Process i.e. Israel and Palestine, Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, the Western Balkans, Western Europe including Turkey and finally a thematic category 
i.e. when there is no geographic relevance. This division corresponds with geographic bureaus within 
the EEAS.
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Figure 3: Percentage of the declaratory diplomacy by regions during the pre-Lisbon (January 2005 – June 2009) and 
post-Lisbon eras (January 2010 – October 2014)13.
The analysis of the geography of the declaratory diplomacy arouses several remarks. First, in terms 
of geographic area, Africa is quantitatively the first region followed by the Middle East and the Gulf, 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Asia and the Pacific, North Africa, the Middle East Peace Process, 
Latin America, Western Balkans and North America. In relation to the declaratory diplomacy of the 
pre-Lisbon period14, the hierarchy between the regions did not change on the top and on the bottom. 
However, Asia and the Pacific have been outreached by the Middle East and the Gulf and by Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia. Indeed, as explained below, the crisis of the “Arab spring” in the south and 
in Ukraine in the east have triggered many statements and declarations which explains the rise of their 
regions in the quantitative ranking.                    
13  For the pre-Lisbon era, North Africa is merged into the Middle East and Gulf region.
14  T. Vončina, supra n.6, at 177.
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Figure 4: The High Representative’s declaratory diplomacy by region and by trimester.
The figure above highlights the geographic variation of the declaratory diplomacy by trimester. Two 
remarks pop up. On the one hand, it appears that the geographic distribution do not vary a lot. Trimester 
by trimester, the trend of each region appears stable. Furthermore, each region receives statements and 
declarations each trimester. There is no region disappearing in the table. On the other hand, three major 
variations occur matching the major international crisis between 2010 and 2014. First, the uprisings 
following the “Arab Spring” in North Africa induced a booming of the declaratory diplomacy in the 
first trimester of 2011 while the region was quantitatively of low importance before and also after these 
events. Second, following the “Arab spring”, the Middle East and the Gulf region skyrocketed in 2011 
and then pursued a stable trend, mostly feed by the war in Syria. Third, in 2014 the Ukrainian crisis 
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led to a growth in the declaratory diplomacy concerning Central Europe and Central Asia. The ongoing 
crisis and the West-Russia confrontation about it fed this trend in 2014.
Then, a closer look to the geography of the declaratory diplomacy shows that statements and declara-
tions concern no less than 130 countries in the world. Such empiric evidence acknowledges the inter-
national role of the EU and its willingness to spread an EU message to the world. The unmentioned 
countries are mostly the small states of the Asia-Pacific Region, of the Caribbean, small neighbours of 
South Africa and the Central American States15. The most surprising exceptions are Brazil, Australia 
and Turkmenistan. While the first two are partners of the EU, the latter is a close neighbour whose in-
ternal situation should deserve some EU interests16. Among those 130 countries, the most represented 
are the following ones. Together, they represent the half of the whole High Representative’s declara-
tory diplomacy.
Table 1: Top countries of the High Representative Declaratory Diplomacy.
Country Country
1 Syria 99 9 China 46
2 Israel/Pal-estine 97 10 Belarus 41
3 (South) Soudan 82 11 Russia 40
4 Iran 71 12 USA 34
5 Ukraine 71 13 Yemen 34
6 Egypt 69 14 Somalia 33
7 Iraq 65 15 Afghani-stan 28
8 Libya 48 16 Mali 28
Two remarks arise from this table. On the one hand, most priorities concern crisis, conflict and wars. 
While the focus on the “Arab spring” crisis, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia and Israel/Palestine 
is part of the CNN issues, such quantitative priority for both Sudan’s and Belarus are more surprising. 
On the other hand, in this top league, three countries are EU strategic partnership namely China, Russia 
15  On the exception of microstates, the unmentioned countries are the follow ones: Australia, Belize, Botswana, 
Brazil, Costa Rica, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Jamaica, Namibia, Oman, Panama, 
Turkmenistan and Uruguay.
16  Human Rights Watch, World Report 2014, 503-510 (2014).
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and the USA. A close analysis of the declaratory diplomacy concerning those countries would high-
light the mains drivers of such priorities17.
Moreover, as Vončina pointed out for the pre-Lisbon period, it is not possible to conclude that geo-
graphical areas located nearer to the EU are of greater importance than those areas that are more 
distant18. Furthermore, the link between the number of statements and declarations and the impor-
tance for the EU is difficult to establish. Indeed, the declaratory diplomacy is not the only tools of 
the EU foreign policy and so not the only indicator of priority. In fact, it might be considered that 
in some case the declaratory diplomacy is one of the few available tools when the structural for-
eign policy and the relational foreign policy are not more possible. Besides, a high number of state-
ments and declarations may also hide incapacity of action on behalf of the EU. Hence, issuing a lot 
of statements and declarations can appear to be a loophole. Likewise, a low number of statements 
is not necessary an indicator of no policy or no priority. There is a tension between the traditional 
diplomacy and the modern declaratory diplomacy. The latter is public while the former one is qui-
et. This tension reflects another tension of the EU foreign policy between the impact and the ac-
countability and the transparency to the public opinion. In some case, the declaratory diplomacy is 
not advised because the targeted country does not want to be perceived as acting under pressure. 
  The moTives of The DeclaraTory DiPlomacy
  After a survey of the geographic relevance of the statements and declarations and the 
identification of some target countries, one question still remains: what triggers the declaratory di-
plomacy? Vončina already identified six motives for issuing statements and declarations during the 
pre-Lisbon period19. On the basis of her findings, we propose eight reasons driving the High Represen-
tative’s declaratory diplomacy. They are combined as follow : (1) the opinion of/ position on a current 
situation or event, (2), the position on Human Rights cases (3) the position on the situation before or 
17  On China see : A. Feron, The HR/VP and China : Assessing Ashton’s Style,32bis Note d’analyse de la Chaire 
InBev-Baillet Latour UCL (2014).
18  T. Vončina, supra n.6, at 177.
19  T. Vončina, supra n.6, at 180-184.
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after elections, (4) the reaction and condolences after terrorist acts, (5) the positive opinion on legal or 
political acts, (6) the notification of the alignment of Third States on the EU restrictive measures, (7) 
the position on the occasion of the various anniversaries, (8) the reaction to naturel disasters and others 
accidents.
Primo, the opinion of / position on a current event or political situation is the most frequent reason driv-
ing the High Representative’s declaratory diplomacy. According to the table below, it represents more 
than one third of the whole statements and declarations. Those latters refer to crisis, conflicts, wars, 
unstable political situations, violations of the international law, acts stimulating one of those situations 
and acts threatening the international peace and security.  Those issues are considered not in accor-
dance with the principles advocated by the European Union and consequently perceived negatively or 
neutrally. The declaratory diplomacy referring to positive opinion has its own group. For example of 
such statements, on February 2011, the High Representative reacted on Egypt following the speech of 
President Mubarak and called for a transition to democracy20. On another case, in February 2013, she 
was concerned by the visit of Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir to Chad despite the warrant issued 
by the International Criminal Court that the Chad authority voluntary failed to implement21.
Secundo, the position on the Human Rights cases: the thematic of Human Rights is the second motive 
driving the declaratory diplomacy. As for the pre-Lisbon period, it ranges from death penalty, political 
prisoners, human rights militants, freedom of the media to children in armed conflicts. While some 
statements and declarations deal with specific cases, other repeatedly refers to the same case. In those 
cases, the High Representative not only expresses the EU policy but also calls for attention to be paid 
to violations of international law, as well as respect for international legal obligations22.  For example, 
she reacted several times to the execution of inmates in the USA and called for a global moratorium as 
a first step towards the universal abolition of the capital punishment23. On a less specific level, she re-
20  Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on Egypt following the speech of President Mubarak, 
10 February 2011, ref: A051/11.
21  Statement by the spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the visit of Sudanese Pres-
ident Al-Bashir to Chad, 21 February 2013, ref: A96/13.
22  T. Vončina, supra n.6, at 183.
23  E.a. : Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union on the 
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acted to the general situation of the human rights of the LGBT in Malawi and called on the Government 
of Malawi to fulfil its obligations under international law to which it is a party24.  
Tertio, expressing a position on the situation before or after elections represents the third most fre-
quent motive for issuing statements and declarations. Those latters refer mostly to elections or referen-
dums held in countries that, according to the EU, have unresolved issues or to which the international 
community devotes special attention. They also draw attention to the importance of elections and the 
expectation that they will be conducted correctly. In the aftermath of the election process, the High 
representative express concerns about the electoral process, congratulations to the winners or also do 
not recognized the elections. For example, in June 2014 the High Representative did not recognize the 
presidential election in Syria25 nor did she recognize several elections in the self-proclaimed republics 
of the frozen conflicts in the post-soviet space26.
Quarto, the reaction and condolences after terrorist acts constitute 11% of the declaratory diplomacy. 
In such cases, the High Representative reacts to suicide bombings, terrorist attacks, abductions or as-
sassinations. Among those, terrorist acts in Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan or committed by ISIL are the 
most represented. Some statements also concern EU member states and close neighbours. For example 
the High Representative reacted, in March 2012 to the murder in a Jewish School in France27, in May 
2014 to the shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels28 and in July 2011 to the killings at Utoya Island 
in Norway29.
abolition of the death penalty in Maryland, USA, 2 May 2014, ref: 9212/13 P180; Statement by EU High Repre-
sentative on the execution of Clayton Lockett in the US State of Oklahoma, 9 May 2014, ref: 140509/01.
24  Declaration by High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on the human rights 
of LGBT people in Malawi, 21 May 2010, ref : 10103/10 P23.
25  Statement on the presidential elections in Syria, 4 June 2014, ref: 140604/03.
26  E.a. : Statement by the Spokesperson on the “presidential elections” in the breakaway region of Abkhazia in 
Georgia, 24 Augustus 2014, ref:  140824/01; Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Nagorno 
Karabakh, 18 July 2012, ref: A333/12; Statement on the reported holding of local “elections” in Crimea, 15 Sep-
tember 2014, ref: 140915/01.
27  Statement by the Spokesperson of the EU High Representative on the murders at the Ozar Hatorah school 
in Toulouse, 20 March 2012, ref: A135/12.
28  Statement by the EU High Representative on the shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, 24 May 2014, 
ref: 140524/02.
29  Statement by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on the killings at Utoya Island in Norway, 23 July 
2011, ref: A295/11.
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Quinto, the position on a legal or political act differs lightly from the Event group. Indeed, such state-
ments and declarations react to a legal act such as the signing or the ratification of a treaty, the adap-
tation of constitutional amendments or a political act such as the formation of a new government, the 
adaptation of a roadmap for ending a transition period or an agreement between two countries. In all 
cases, the High Representative expresses a positive opinion on the event. For example, in March 2010, 
she congratulated Bangladesh for the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court30 and in June 2014 she welcomed the first step of a negotiation between the Government of Co-
lombia and the FARC31.
Sexto, statements and declarations announcing restrictive measures and the alignment of certain third 
countries are a small group of the declaratory diplomacy. On the one hand, the High Representative 
announces restrictive measure besides the publishing on the Official Journal of the European Union. 
On the other hand, the High Representative uses declarations to announce the alignment of certain third 
countries to the EU sanctions. The aligned countries are often the following ones: Croatia as accessing 
country; the candidate countries Turkey, Serbia, ARYM, Montenegro, Iceland; Albania as potential 
candidate country; the Western European neighbours such as Norway and Liechtenstein; and finally 
some Eastern European neighbours such as Georgia, Armenia and Moldova.
Septimo, statements and declarations presenting the position on the occasion of various anniversaries 
are also one of the least used motives of the declaratory diplomacy. In most of the cases, those latters 
present the EU’s standpoint on the thematic of various anniversaries. The Holocaust Remembrance 
Day32, the World and European Water Day33, the International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples34, 
30  Statement by High Representative Ashton on the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court by Bangladesh, 26 March 2010, ref : A 41/10.
31  Statement by the Spokesperson on the announcement of a set of principles for discussing issues related 
to victims in negotiations between the Government of Colombia and the FARC, 10 June 2014, ref: 140610/02.
32  Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on International Holocaust Remembrance Day, 27 
January 2013, ref: A42/13.
33  Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on the occasion 
of the World and European Water Day, 22 March 2011, ref: 8053/11 P77.
34  Declaration by High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on the International 
Day of the World’s Indigenous People, 9 Augustus 2010, ref: 12762/10 P224.
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the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture35, the International Women’s 
Day36, the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination37 but also the second an-
niversary of the publication of the Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry38, the 
anniversary of South Soudan’s independence39 or the anniversary of the Declaration of Liberation in 
Libya40 are among the examples.
Octavo, the reaction to naturel disasters and other accidents represents, as Vončina pointed out, a spe-
cific set of statements, which are issued mostly when humankind is affected by floods, earthquakes, air-
craft accidents and other disasters with a large number of victims41. Earthquake in Chile42, presidential 
Polish plane crash43, train derailment in India44, mudslides in china45, building collapse in Bangladesh46, 
landslide in Afghanistan47, Hurricane in North America48 are among the examples. In such cases, the 
High Representative expresses condolences. These statements and declarations only represent 2% of 
the whole. Consequently this is the least used motive.
35  Declaration by the EU on the occasion of the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Tor-
ture, 26 June 2014, ref: 11379/1/14 P373.
36  Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on International Women’s Day, 8 March 2013, ref: 
A124/13.
37  Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union on the occasion 
of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 21 March 2013, ref: 7763/13 P128.
38  Statement by the Spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the second anniversary 
of the publication of the Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 25 November 2013, ref: 
131125/02.
39  Joint statement of the High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Andris Piebalgs on the first 
anniversary of the Republic of South Sudan’s independence, 9 July 2013, ref: A314/12.
40  Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the third anniversary of the revolution in Libya, 
17 February 2014, ref: 140218/01.
41  T. Vončina, supra n.6, at 181.
42  Statement by HR Catherine Ashton on the earthquake in Chile, 27 February 2010, ref: A28/10.
43  Statement by European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton 
on Polish plane crash, 10 April 2010, ref: A55/10.
44  Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on train derailment in India, 29 May 2010, ref: A94/10.
45  Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the recent mudslides in China, 11 Augustus 2010, 
ref: A158/10.
46  Joint Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht 
following the recent building collapse in Bangladesh, 30 April 2013, ref: A233/13.
47  Statement by the Spokespersons of the EEAS and the EU Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid on the land-
slide in Afghanistan, 3 May 2014, ref: 140503/03.
48  Statement by the spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the destructive passage of 
Hurricane Sandy in the United States and Canada, 30 October 2012, ref: A482/12.
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Figure 5: Percentage of the total High Representative’s Declaratory Diplomacy according to the eight motives.
  The TriPle objecTive of The DeclaraTory DiPlomacy
  The nature, the geography and the motives of the High Representative’s declaratory di-
plomacy have been demonstrated. Hence, one final question still remains: Who is it for? At first sight, 
statements and declarations are made for the countries identified in the section on the geographical 
referent. However, the matter is more complex.
Actually, the declaratory diplomacy follows a triple objective. This triple analysis is an adaptation of 
Barber’s model establishing a triple distinction for the international sanctions49 and then recomposed 
and adapted to the European Union by De Wilde50. Indeed, the first objective concerns the target which 
is easily identified in the content of the statements and declarations. For the target, the objective match-
es one of the eight motives, which can serve as confidence building measures. The second objective 
focuses on the sender i.e. the European Union via its High Representative. The latter want to demon-
49  J. Barber, Economic sanctions as a policy instrument, 55 International Affairs 367-384 (1979).
50  T. de Wilde, Les sanctions économiques comme moyens de politique étrangère, in La politique étrangère : 
le modèle classique à l’épreuve (C. Roosens, V. Rosoux & T. de Wilde eds., Peter-Lang 2004).
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strate a capacity to express its opinion, to at least say something and to move from silence to the words. 
This capacity of speaking appeases the public opinion and/or responds to internal demands from EU 
institutions or member states. Last but not least the third objective is related to a third party or to the 
international community. In this case, the sender wants to support the action of third parties or arouse 
their support, or also to remind erga omnes the principles driving the external action of the European 
Union, its objectives and his coherence.
The triple objective analysis takes place in one of the area of tension of the EU foreign policy between 
external and internal objectives. On the one hand, the first objective is obviously related to an external 
objective following one of the eight identified motives. On the other hand, the second objective follows 
internal objectives either an inter-relational one aiming at managing relations with some member states 
or with some EU institutions, either an identity one aiming at asserting the identity of the EU51. The 
third objective can be part of both external and internal objectives. Indeed, on the one hand, statements 
and declarations can be used for backing a third party or arousing support. In this case, the declaratory 
diplomacy relates to external actors, even if they are not explicitly mentioned. On the other hand, it 
contributes to develop the identity of the EU on the international stage. Indeed, reminding the objec-
tives and principles of the EU is part of the internal objective. This triple analysis and its inherent ten-
sion between internal and external objectives demonstrate the complexity of the High Representative’s 
declaratory diplomacy as an instrument of EU foreign policy.
  conclusIons
  This presentation allows a better understanding of what is the High Representative’s 
declaratory diplomacy. All along this paper, we presented elements of a response to the four research 
questions: Firstly, what is the nature of the High Representative’s declaratory diplomacy? Secondly, 
what is its geography? Thirdly, what are the motives driving it? Finally, what are the objectives?
During her five years term, the High Representative C. Ashton issued 1573 statements and declara-
51  S. Keukeleire & T. Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 24, Palgrave Macmillan (2014).
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tions. Actually, her declaratory diplomacy is more abundant than her predecessors, both the High Rep-
resentative J. Solana and the rotating presidency for CFSP before the Lisbon treaty. While declarations 
are becoming less frequent, the High Representative issues mostly statements on her own or via her 
spokesperson. Joint statements are also use in some circumstances but never in a systematic way. In 
this regard, the early days of the Lisbon treaty offered some joint initiatives with European institutions 
or member states. Then, a routine emerged restricting the joint CFSP statements to the High represen-
tative and her colleagues from the Commission.
Furthermore, the High Representative’s declaratory diplomacy touches on almost all countries of the 
world, with a few noticing exceptions. The High Representative’s world declaratory diplomacy demon-
strates the international interests of the EU and its will to spread an EU message to world. Hence, the 
EU via its High Representative is a diplomatic actor52 and its declaratory diplomacy shapes the EU’s 
profile as an international actor. The quantitative hierarchy between the world’s regions still follows the 
same pattern than during the pre-Lisbon period, on the exception of the Middle East/ Gulf region and 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This climbing is due to an abundant declaratory diplomacy concern-
ing the crisis of the “Arab Spring” and in Ukraine.
By essence, statements and declarations are a reaction to a current situation. However, the High Repre-
sentative’s declaratory diplomacy can be further conceptualized. Indeed, eight different motives for is-
suing statements and declarations can be isolated. Whereas some concern accidents or natural disasters 
or the alignment of third countries on EU restrictive measures, other refers to multiple anniversaries, or 
even to the adoption of legal/political acts considered as positive by the EU, the top trio of the motives 
is distributed as follows: the opinion or position on a current event or political situation, the position 
on human rights cases and finally the position on elections in third countries.
Finally, the declaratory diplomacy follows a triple objective concerning the target country, the EU itself 
and the international community. This triple objective takes place into an area of tension of EU foreign 
policy between external objectives i.e. the eight motives of the declaratory diplomacy; and internal 
52  M. H. Smith, The EU as a Diplomatic Actor in the Post-Lisbon Era : Robust or Rootless Hybrid?, in The Eu-
ropean Union as a Diplomatic Actor (J. A. Koops & G. Macaj eds., Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
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objectives. Those latter are either inter-relational i.e. managing relations with member states or EU 
institutions either identity i.e. aiming at asserting the identity of the EU.
In conclusion, by answering four connected research questions and offering quantitative data, this 
paper provides a cartography of the High Representative’s declaratory diplomacy during C. Ashton’s 
tenure and updates the knowledge on this instrument of foreign policy after the Lisbon Treaty. Besides 
the limits of such quantitative approach, it helps to apprehend this phenomenon. While the objective of 
this paper is to present a general review of High Representative declaratory diplomacy, it consequently 
left out some specific aspects such as the impact, the timing, the contribution to the CFSP, and finally 
the discretion of the High Representative. All of these aspects require further in-depth case studies.
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